Везде
MAJORITY OPTIMIZATION OF TAXES, SOCIAL TRANSFERS, PRICES AND WAGES
Table of contents
Annotation Estimate Publication content
References Comments
Share
QR
Metrics
MAJORITY OPTIMIZATION OF TAXES, SOCIAL TRANSFERS, PRICES AND WAGES
Annotation
PII
S042473880000616-6-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Sergei Graborov 
Edition
Volume 51 Issue 1
Pages
80-96
Abstract

A procedure of nonlinear taxes optimization jointly with social transfers, prices and wages by the majority rule is suggested. The conditions of taxation unifi cation that are suffi cient for getting a single optimal decision for every participant of coalition of “pure” workers and transfer recipients are found. A mathematical programming task allow fi nding this decision is formulated.

Keywords
taxes, social transfers, prices, indexation, optimization, majority rule
Date of publication
01.01.2015
Number of purchasers
1
Views
850
Readers community rating
0.0 (0 votes)
Cite   Download pdf
1

References



Additional sources and materials

Atkinson Eh.B., Stiglits Dzh.Eh. (1995). Lektsii po ehkonomicheskoj teorii gosudarstvennogo sektora. M.: Aspekt Press.


Belousova N.I., Vasil'eva E.M., Livshits V.N. (2012). Modeli identifikatsii estestvennykh monopolij i gosudarstvennogo upravleniya imi (vozmozhnosti rasshireniya klassicheskoj teorii) // Ehkonomika i mat. metody. T. 48. № 3.Gosudarstvennoe regulirovanie rynochnoj ehkonomiki (2003). M.: RAGS.


Graborov S.V. (2007a). Optimizatsiya byudzhetno-nalogovoj struktury s mnogimi nalogovymi funktsiyami. Preprint #WP/2007/226. M.: TsEhMI RAN.


Graborov S.V. (2007b). Protsedura rascheta optimal'noj dvukhurovnevoj byudzhetno-nalogovoj struktury. Preprint #WP/2007/232. M.: TsEhMI RAN.


Graborov S.V. (2009). Protsedury optimizatsii dinamicheskoj nalogovoj struktury. Preprint #WP/2009/262. M.: TsEhMI RAN.


Graborov S.V. (2011a). Mazhoritarnaya optimizatsiya byudzhetnykh dokhodov i raskhodov. Preprint #WP/2011/286. M.: TsEhMI RAN.


Graborov S.V. (2011b). Protsedura rascheta parametrov ravnovesnogo sostoyaniya obschestvennogo vybora v byudzhetno-nalogovoj sfere. Preprint #WP/2011/287. M.: TsEhMI RAN.


Graborov S.V. (2013). Protsedury obschestvennogo vybora linejnoj byudzhetno-nalogovoj struktury // Ehkonomika i mat. metody. T. 49. № 2.


Zanadvorov V.S., Kolosnitsyna M.G. (2006). Ehkonomicheskaya teoriya gosudarstvennykh finansov. M.: GU VShEh.


Zakharov A.V. (2009). Modeli politicheskoj konkurentsii: obzor literatury // Ehkonomika i mat. metody. T. 45. № 1.


Korovkin V.V. (2006). Osnovy teorii nalogooblozheniya. M.: Ehkonomist'.


Livshits V.N., Pozamantir Eh.I., Smolyak S.A. (2013). Sistema tarifov po gruzovym perevozkam, osuschestvlyaemym v Rossii OAO “RZhD” // Ehkonomika i mat. metody. T. 49. № 3.


Martynov G.V., Malkov U.Kh. (2012). Modelirovanie dinamiki otraslevykh urovnej tsen // Ehkonomika i mat. metody. T. 48. № 1.


Mednitskij V.G., Mednitskij Yu.V. (2013). Sbalansirovannost', optimal'nost' i ehkonomicheskoe ravnovesie v otkrytykh proizvodstvennykh sistemakh // Ehkonomika i mat. metody. T. 49. № 3.


Mescheryakova O.V. (1995). Nalogovye sistemy razvitykh stran mira (spravochnik). M.: Fond “Pravovaya kul'tura”.


Saks Dzh.D., Larren F.B. (1996). Makroehkonomika. Global'nyj podkhod. M.: Delo.


Stiglits Dzh.Yu. (1997). Ehkonomika gosudarstvennogo sektora. M.: Izd-vo MGU im. M.V. Lomonosova.


Ehrrou K.Dzh. (2004). Kollektivnyj vybor i individual'nye tsennosti. M.: Izdatel'skij dom GU VShEh.


Bucovetsky S. (1991). Choosing Tax Rates and Public Expenditure Levels Using Majority Rule // Journal of Public Economics. Vol. 46. No. 1 (October).


Calabrese S.M. (2007). Majority Voting over Publicly Provided Goods, Redistribution and Income Taxation // Journal of Public Economic Theory. Vol. 9. No. 2.


Couglin P.J. (1986). Elections and Income Redistribution // Public Choice. Vol. 50. No. 1–3.


Glomm G., Ravikumar B. (1998). Opting out of Publicly Provided Services: A Majority Voting Result // Social Choice and Welfare. No. 15.


Persson T., Tabellini G. (1994). Representative Democracy and Capital Taxation // Journal of Public Economics. Vol. 55. No. 3.


Persson T., Tabellini G. (2000). Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. L.: The MIT Press.


Roberts K.W.S. (1977). Voting over Income Tax Schedules // Journal of Public Economics. Vol. 8. No. 3.

Comments

No posts found

Write a review
Translate