SPONSORED-SEARCH AUCTIONS: APPROACHES AND THEORETICAL MODELS
Table of contents
Share
QR
Metrics
SPONSORED-SEARCH AUCTIONS: APPROACHES AND THEORETICAL MODELS
Annotation
PII
S042473880000616-6-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Pages
14-24
Abstract

The article reviews the basic approaches and theoretical models that describe the features and peculiarities of the modern and rapidly developing market of sponsored-search auctions on the Internet. We pay main attention to the sponsored-search auction design models and its comparative analysis. We also describe and compare different theoretical frameworks for this agenda, including static and dynamic games of perfect and imperfect information, structural models and models of users’ behavior. This branch of literature is relatively new, but it already attracts a signifi cant attention of world-leading scholars due to its high practical importance and new challenges to mechanism design theory.

Keywords
auction theory, sponsored-search auctions, marketing, advertising
Date of publication
01.10.2015
Number of purchasers
1
Views
722
Readers community rating
0.0 (0 votes)
Cite   Download pdf
1

References



Additional sources and materials

Athey S., Ellison G. (2011). Position Auctions with Consumer Search // Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 126. P. 1213–1270.

Athey S., Nekipelov D. (2009). A Structural Model of Equilibrium and Uncertainty in Sponsored Search Advertising Auctions // Working paper.

Borgers T., Cox I., Pesendorfer M., Petricek V. (2008). Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence // Working paper.

Cary M., Das A., Edelman B., Giotis I., Heimerl K., Karlin A., Kominers S., Mathieu C., Schwarz M.

(2013). Convergence of Position Auctions under Myopic Best-Response Dynamics // ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (forthcoming).

Chen Y., He C. (2011). Paid Placement: Advertising and Search on the Internet // Economic Journal. Vol. 121. P. 309–328.

Edelman B., Ostrovsky M., Schwarz M. (2007). Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction:

Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords // American Economic Review. Vol. 97. P. 242–259.

Edelman B., Schwarz M. (2006). Optimal Auction Design in a Multi-unit Environment: The Case of Sponsored Search Auctions // Working paper.

Mas-Colell A., Whinston M., Green J. (1995). Microeconomic Theory. New York: Oxford Press.

Ostrovsky M., Schwarz M. (2009). Reserve Prices in Internet Advertising Auctions: A Field Experiment // Working paper.

Varian H. (2007). Position Auctions // International Journal of Industrial Organization. Vol. 25. P. 1163–1178.

Comments

No posts found

Write a review
Translate