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THE DIFFERENTIATION OF THE AUTHORITY IN TAX INCENTIVES AMONG THE FEDERAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS. FISCAL IMPLICATIONS

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PII
S042473880000616-6-1
DOI
10.31857/S0000616-6-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Milyausha Pinskaya
Georgy Kolesnik
Volume/ Edition
Volume 52 / Issue 3
Pages
22-35
Abstract
The authors study the problems associated with the differentiation of the authority to establish tax incentives among the federal and regional government bodies and assess the corresponding negative impact on the tax competition. In is shown that the federal intervention in the regional tax privileges setting may lead to a distortion of vertical tax competition, a shortfall in tax revenues in the regional budgets, as well as to the migration of the tax base between regions, thereby distorting the real pocture of the profi ts allocation. The results obtained can be used by federal and regional public authorities in the development of proposals for improving mechanisms of tax privileges provision and interbudgetary transfers optimization.
Keywords
tax powers, tax privileges, tax competition, profit tax, property tax, regional budget, interbudgetary relations, federative system, vertical tax effect, consolidated group of taxpayers
Date of publication
01.07.2016
Number of purchasers
1
Views
852

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