NATURAL GAS TRANSIT: THE TRADING MODEL
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NATURAL GAS TRANSIT: THE TRADING MODEL
Annotation
PII
S042473880000616-6-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Edition
Pages
24-37
Abstract
To analyze the Russian-Ukrainian negotiations on the transit of natural gas to Europe applies an expanded model of bilateral bargaining. The derived stable Nash equilibrium is used to estimate the minimum change in gas transit volumes through Ukraine, which is necessary to significantly strengthen Russia's market position.
Keywords
natural gas transit, Russia, Ukraine, bargaining model
Date of publication
01.10.2010
Number of purchasers
2
Views
759
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0.0 (0 votes)
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Additional sources and materials

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