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A MODEL OF COMPETITION WITH EXPENSES ON THE ELECTION COMPETITION
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A MODEL OF COMPETITION WITH EXPENSES ON THE ELECTION COMPETITION
Annotation
PII
S042473880000616-6-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Alexey Zakharov 
Edition
Volume 46 Issue 2
Pages
60-77
Abstract

This work looks at a model of spatial election competition with two candidates who can spend effort in order to increase their popularity through advertisement. It is shown that under certain condition the political programs of the candidates will be different. The work derives the comparative statics of equilibrium policy platform and campaign spending with respect the distribution of voter policy preferences and the proportionality of the electoral system. In particular, it is whown that the equilibrium does not exist if the policy preferences are distributed over too narrow an interval.

Keywords
spatial election competition, choice, political programs, voters preferences, electoral system, equilibrium
Date of publication
01.04.2010
Number of purchasers
2
Views
761
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0.0 (0 votes)
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