MODEL OF RATIONAL BEHAVIOR OF THE TAXPAYER
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MODEL OF RATIONAL BEHAVIOR OF THE TAXPAYER
Annotation
PII
S042473880000616-6-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Edition
Pages
3-11
Abstract
An economic and mathematical model of the taxpayer's behavior that maximizes its winnings by choosing the scale of tax evasion is constructed. The relation between the average tax rates, penalties and other costs of tax evasion, on the one hand, and incentives of an economic agent, the value of public wealth and corruption, on the other hand.
Date of publication
01.04.2007
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0
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877
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Yitzhaki S. (1974): A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis // J. of Public Econ. № 3.

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