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EFFICIENCY INCREASE IN MECHANISM DESIGN OF STATE PROCUREMENT FOR R&D
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EFFICIENCY INCREASE IN MECHANISM DESIGN OF STATE PROCUREMENT FOR R&D
Annotation
PII
S042473880000616-6-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Alexey Kuchaev 
Edition
Volume 51 Issue 2
Pages
70-88
Abstract
In this paper the author considers a modifi cation in mechanism design for R&D in order to increase its effi ciency and to create incentives for business implication.
Keywords
mechanism design, R&D, state procurement, auctions, pilot production
Date of publication
01.04.2015
Number of purchasers
1
Views
773
Readers community rating
0.0 (0 votes)
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Additional sources and materials

Brocas I. (2006). Designing Auctions in R&D: Optimal Licensing of an Innovation // Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy. Vol. 6(1). Article 11.


Brozen J. (1951). Invention, Innovation and Imitation // American Economic Review. Vol. 41. Papers and Proceedings. P. 239–257.


Dasgupta P., Stiglitz J. (1980). Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R&D // Bell Journal of Economics. Vol. 11. P. 1–28.


Katz M. L., Shapiro C. (1985). On the Licensing of Innovation // Rand Journal of Economics. Vol. 16. P. 504– 520.


Katz M.L., Shapiro C. (1986). How to License Intangible Property // Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 101. P. 567–589.


Krishna V. (2010). Auction Theory. Burlington: Academic Press/Elsevier.


Mokyr J. (1990). The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress. N.Y.: Oxford University Press.


Reinganum J. (1989). The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development, and Diffusion. Ch. 14. In: “Handbook of Industrial Organization” R. Schmalensee, R. Willig (eds.). Vol. 1. N.Y.: Elsevier.

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